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Eleven years ago, Congress decided in the form 
of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 that the 
operational decisions of airlines-where planes 
can fly and what fares can be charged-would be 
better left to the airlines than to the regulators. 
This decision has caused numerous changes 
in the industry: discount fares have become 
widespread and  has boomed, new carriers 
have come and  hub-and-spoke networks 
have emerged, and frequent-flier plans have 
become the rage. As long as the industry remains 
competitive, many analysts assert that travelers 
have little to fear from these continuing changes, 
since competition ensures that fares are held 
close to cost and that economically viable service 
is provided. 
With the consolidation of the airline industry 
that started in 1986, many analysts have begun to 
wonder about its competitiveness, both now and 
in the future. The wave of mergers has resulted 
in an increase in the number of airlines that offer 
nationwide service, but this comes in the form of 
"fortress hubs."At  such airports, the dominant 
carrier typically offers about three-quarters of the 
airport's flights. In addition, the national carriers 
now face less competition from regional and 
local service carriers, many of whom have been 
purchased by or signed operating agreements 
with the national carriers. The impact of these 
developments (and of possible future consolida-
tions) on fares depends on the competitiveness 
of the markets for air travel. 
To gain insight into the competitiveness of the 
airline industry, this paper examines the determi-
nants of air fares for first-class, coach, and dis-
count service to a particular destination: Cleve-
land, Ohio. We begin by examining two of the 
market models that have been proposed for the 
airline industry. The first is the traditional view 
that market competitiveness is determined by the 
number and concentration of firms in the market. 
The second is the theory of contestable markets, 
in which the number of actual competitors in 
the market plays only a small role. According to 
this theory, it is the number of carriers that could 
potentially enter the market that constrains fares. 
We then discuss the implications for appro-
priate public policy. A reduced-form equation for 
air fares is constructed, and the data that were 
collected to estimate its parameters are de-
scribed. Finally, we present and analyze the 
empirical results and discuss the implications for 
public policy. 
http://clevelandfed.org/research/review/Our results suggest that these markets (the air-
line routes) are not perfectly contestable. The 
number of actual competitors does influence the 
fares charged by the airlines, other things being 
equal. Thus, policymakers should act where pos-
sible to ease entry barriers in the industry in 
order to preserve and enhance competition. 
I.  Economic Models 
of  Airline Competition 
The traditional method of determining the 
amount of competition in a market is to examine 
the market shares of the largest firms operating 
in that market. This measure is relevant because, 
until recently, most economists thought that 
competitiveness was determined by the number 
and concentration of the actual participants in 
the market. 
The U.S. Department of Justice uses a 
Hirschman-Herfindahl Index (HHI: the sum of the 
squares of all of the firms' market shares) as an 
aid in assessing the impact of proposed mergers 
on market competition. This index ranges from 
close to zero in the case of a perfectly competi-




in the case of a 
monopoly.' 
1  Since the market shares are squared before summing, the market 
shares of the largest firms  rfiost.  will influence the index the 
The Department  guidelines 
recommend rejecting mergers that result in mar-
kets with an HHI greater than 1,800 unless the 
resulting increase in the HHI is less than 50 or 
there are some other special considerations. The 
rationale is that fewer competitors reduce the 
competitiveness of the market, since there will 
be less pressure to hold down prices and costs 
and since the firms will find it easier to collude. 
The airline industry appears to be very 
uncompetitive when one examines the  of 
various airline routes. According to a recent 
Congressional Budget Office study, on a typical 
route only 2.5 carriers offer service. Even if these 
carriers each had an equal share of the market, 
this would result in an HHI of over 4,000. 
The U.S. Department of Transportation-the 
agency charged with oversight of the airline 
industry-has taken a different approach than 
the Justice Department. Over the last few years, it 
has allowed mergers to occur between carriers 
even when many of their routes overlapped. For 
example,  and Ozark competed on many 
routes involving their joint hub of St. Louis, and 
their merger in 1986 resulted in a large increase 
in concentration on these routes. In 1983, the 






risen to about 6,800, with 
potenti-l  com- 
offering about 82 
percent of the flights out of St. Louis. The 
Ozark merger was clearly outside the Depart-
ment of Justice's guidelines discussed above 
(however, there was the special consideration 
that Ozark was in financial difficulty and might 
have failed unless it was taken over). 
In approving mergers such as this one, the 
Department of Transportation relied heavily on 
the relatively new theory of contestable markets 
developed primarily by Baumol, Panzar, and 
2  The theory of contestable markets has been applied to a number of 
other industries. Whalen (1988) finds evidence that the banking industry is per-
fectly contestable. 
This theory states that under certain 
conditions, it is not necessary to have a large 
number of firms actually operating in a market in 
order for prices and output in that market to 
approximate the ideal outcome of a perfectly 
competitive market. If  entry barriers into the 
market are low, and if there are no irrecoverable 
costs to exiting the market, then even markets 
with only a few firms will be constrained to fol-
low the same marginal-cost pricing that perfect 
competition with many firms would. If the firms 
in the market tried to raise prices above marginal 
cost (the extra cost of producing an additional 
unit of output), then entrepreneurs could enter 
the market and charge a slightly lower price than 
the incumbent firms (taking away those firms' 
customers) and could earn an above-average 
profit. The ease of entry and exit  a perfectly 
contestable industry means that  a 
petitors also exercise competitive pressure on 
the firms in the industry. 
There were several reasons to believe that the 
airline industry might approximate a perfectly con-
testable market after the Civil Aeronautics Board 
stopped regulating routes and fares, a process 
phased in over several years starting in the late 
1970s. Planes now can quickly be shifted from 
one route to another, and many of the airlines 
rent a significant proportion of their aircraft fleets. 
In addition, there is a ready secondary market for 
used aircraft, so  a major component of an air-
line's capital stock is much easier to acquire and 
dispose of than in most other industries. 
Working against the idea that the airline indus-
try is perfectly contestable are the current con-
gestion problems in the air traffic control net-
work. Also, new entrants find it difficult to 
acquire gate space and slots for takeoffs and 
landings at the more congested airports. Compu-
ter reservation systems, travel agent commis-
HHI was about 5,800; and in 1988 the HHI had 
sions, frequent-flier plans, and hub-and-spoke 
http://clevelandfed.org/research/review/networks are also cited as characteristics of pro-
viding air service that make entry into new 
markets difficult. Borenstein (1988) provides a 
more detailed investigation of these issues. 
If  the market for air fares approximates a per-
fectly competitive market, then there is very little 
need for government oversight of the economic 
conditions in the airline industry, although there 
still would be a role in the regulation of air 
safety. Actual and potential competitors force the 
airlines serving a market to provide the service 
that passengers want at the lowest possible fares. 
If  the market is not perfectly contestable, then the 
government can ensure that entry into the market 
is as free as possible, and should enforce existing 
antitrust laws to protect consumers by preserving 
as much competition in the market as possible. 
II.  Empirical Model 
and Data 
Although other researchers (for example, Bailey, 
Graham, and Kaplan [1985],  Borenstein  [1988], 
Butler and Huston  [1987],  and Call and Keeler 
[I9851  ) have explored the extent of competition 
in the airline industry by using models similar to 
the one we develop, none of these studies 
employs data as recent as ours (April 1987). 
Thus, not only are our data further away from the 
beginning of deregulation, but they also follow 
the latest wave of mergers that occurred in 1986. 
The following observations will be useful in 
constructing the testable hypotheses. If the 
market were perfectly contestable, then the 
number of carriers serving a route would have 
no relationship to passenger fares. If  potential 
competitors constrain the fare-setting abilities of 
existing carriers, then the market is imperfectly 
contestable and the effect of the number of car-
riers serving a route should have a significant, 
although small, effect on the fares charged. 
Lastly, if entry is so blocked that existing carriers 
have little to fear Erom  new entrants, then the 
degree of competition on a route will be deter-
mined by the number of carriers currently serv-
ing the route, and the effect of an additional car-
rier on the route could cause a significant 
reduction in fares. This is the more traditional 
view of the relationship between the degree of 
competition and the number of competitors. 
In comparing the fares charged with the num-
ber of carriers on the route across routes, one 
must allow for other factors that influence fares. 
In essence, we are estimating a reduced-form 
equatio~  for air fares, so that anything that influ-
ences the demand for, or the cost of, air travel 
(OLS): 
should be taken into account. The most impor-
tant of these factors are the length of the route, 
the volume of traffic on the route, and whether 
one or both of the airports involved are hubs or 
are restricted in takeoff and landing slots. 
The characteristics of a particular flight on a 
given route can also influence both the supply 
and the demand for the flight. The most impor-
tant of these are the number of stops on a par-
ticular flight, whether a meal is provided, and the 
particular carrier offering the flight. Finally, the 
demand for air service on a particular route will 
depend in part on characteristics of the flight's 
origin and destination cities, such as their aver-
age per capita incomes and whether they are 
business or tourist centers. 
We estimate the following model using ordi-
nary least squares 
(I)  a,  CARRIERS 
a,  a3 
a4  aj   MILES^ 
a6 
a9 
a13  EA  a14 
where 	 FARE  = one-way air fare; 
CARRIERS  =  number of carriers; 
CARRIERS2  = number of carriers 
squared; 
PASS  = total number of pas-
sengers flown on route (all 
carriers) ; 
MILES  =  mileage from the origin 
city to Cleveland; 
MILES2  = the number of miles 
squared; 
POP  =  population of the origin city; 
INC  =  per capita income of the 
origin city; 
CORP  =  proxy for potential busi-
ness traffic from the origin 
city; 
SLOT  = dummy variable equaling 
1 if the origin city has a slot- 
restricted airport, 
0 otherwise; 
STOP  =  number of on-flight stops; 
MEAL  =  dummy variable equaling 
1 if a meal is served, 
0 otherwise; 
HUB 	=  dummy variable equaling 
1 if the origin city has a hub 
airline, 0 otherwise; 
'FARE =  +  a, 
+  CARRIERS2  +  PASS 
+  MILES  + 
+  POP  +  a,  INC  +  a, CORP 
+  SLOT  + 	a,,  STOP 
+  a,, MEAL  +  a,,  HUB 




=  dummy variable equaling 
1 if the carrier is Eastern Air-
lines,  otherwise; 
CO 	= dummy variable equaling 
1 if the carrier is Continental 
Airlines,  otherwise. 
This model is estimated separately for each of 
three classes of fares: first class, coach, and re-
stricted discount. 
The data to estimate this model were com-
bined from a number of sources. The Official 
Airline Guide (April 1987) was the source of the 
fare information and the data on the flight char-
acteristics, such as CARRIERS, STOP, SLOT, MEAL, 
EA, 
OfficialAirline 
and CO. All of the data pertain to direct 
domestic flights terminating in Cleveland. Unfor-
tunately, fares for connecting flights could not be 
analyzed here because only direct fares are 
reported in the  Guide. In future 
research, we hope to obtain such data. 
Survty 
Data on passengers (PASS)  and nonstop 
mileage from origin to destination (MILES) were 
taken from the U.S. Department of Transporta-
tion's Origin and Destination City Pair Sum-
mary. Data on per capita income (INC) of the 





Business (April 1986 issue). The number 
of Standard  Poor's companies headquartered in 
each origin city  was compiled to be used 
as a proxy for the business traffic likely to be 
generated by each city. Information on whether 
an origin city was considered to have a hub air-
line (HUB) was obtained from 1985 Department 
of Transportation statistics. For each of the three 
fare classes, summary statistics on the variables 
used in the analysis are provided in table 1. 
First-class Fares  Coach Fares  Discount Fares 
Standard  Standard  Standard 
Variable  Mean  Deviation  Mean  Deviation  Mean  Deviation 
FARE  330.17  123.63  201.78  89.60  62.65  29.85 
CARRIERS  2.77  1.33  2.89  1.25  2.88  1.25 
PASSENGERS  18,458.00  22,802.00  15,260.00  21,414.00  15,273.00  2  1,406.00 
MILES  744.19  535.18  537.27  465.43  541.25  466.32 
INCOME  13,996.00  1,766.00  13,709.00  1,643.60  13,727.00  1,656.10 
COW  10.63  16.67  8.76  15.17  8.75  15.17 
SLOT  0.22  0.42  0.19  0.39  0.19  0.39 
STOP  0.46  0.60  0.41  0.63  0.42  0.63 
MEAL  0.60  0.49  0.44  0.50  0.44  0.50 
HUB  0.71  0.46  0.66  0.47  0.66  0.47 
CO  0.16  0.37  0.08  0.27  0.08  0.27 
EA  0.16  0.37  0.07  0.26  0.08  0.27 
POP  4,046.30  4,668.20  3,497.60  4,184.90  3,493.40  4,187.80 
Ill.  Estimation 
Results 
Tables 2,3,  OIS  and 4 report  estimates of equa-
tion (1)for first-class,  coach, and discount fares. 
The amount of variation in fares explained in 
each estimated equation (the adjusted R-square 
statistics in tables 2 through 4)  is generally high, 
and is higher for the first-class and coach catego-
ries than for the discount category. This is prob-
ably the result of the discount fares being less 
homogeneous than the other fare classes. For 
our discount fare, we always selected the least 
expensive restricted-discount fare reported in the 
OfficialAirline  Guide, and these fares were not 
always subject to exactly the same restrictions3 
3  It was not possible to select one particular type of discount fare fo; 
reported 
all 
of  the routes because no  type of  discount fares were  for all routes. 
In interpreting these results, recall that only 
direct flights to Cleveland were included in the 
data. Also note that since more than 90 percent of 
passengers travel on some type of discount fare, 




Variable  Coefficient 
 Error 

CARRIERS  -19.50  22.20 
CARRIERS2  2.79  4.42 
MILES  0.233  0.455E-1 
MILES2  -0.974E-5  0.197E-4 
POP  -0.598E-2  0.357E-2 
INC  -0.195E-2  0.285E-2 
COW  3.62  1.05 
PASS  -0.818E-3  0.106E-2 
STOP  12.50  9.18 
SLOT  7.13  23.90 
HUB  11.30  12.60 
MEAL  11.20  10.50 
EA  -18.30  11.40 
CO  -66.40  11.60 
CONSTANT  212.00  40.60 
Estimated  Standard 
Variable  Coefficient  Error  T-Ratio 
CARRIERS  -23.00  11.60  -1.99 
CARRIERS2  4.00  2.19  1.83 
MILES  0.277  0.231E-1  12.00 
MILES2  -0.520E-4  0.104E-4  -4.98 
POP  -0.114E-2  0.200E-2  -0.570 
INC  -0.178E-2  0.168E-2  -1.06 
COW  1.22  0.487  2.51 
PASS  -0.275E-3  0.522E-3  -0.527 
STOP  7.64  3.59  2.13 
SLOT  -0.746  11.20  -0.667E-1 
HUB  4.18  5.16  0.810 
MEAL  0.945  5.35  0.177 
EA  5.80  7.48  0.775 
CO  -56.50  7.42  -7.61 




according to the Air Transport Association, this 
class of service is probably the most important for 
evaluating the competitiveness of the indust~y.~
The first issue is the effect of the number of 
carriers on fares. The estimated values for CAR-




for all three classes of fares. These results suggest 
that as additional carriers begin service on a 
route, fares are lowered, since CARRIERS is nega-
tive. But because the coefficient of CARRIERS2 is 
positive, each additional carrier lowers fares on 
the route less than the one before. After three or 
four carriers are serving a route, fares no longer 
appear to be affected by the number of carriers. 
These  are statistically significant 
for coach and discount fares, but are not signifi-
cant for first-class fares. For discount fares, the 
addition of one carrier to a monopoly route 
would lower fares by about $1  1, other things 
being equal. Adding a third carrier to the route 
would again lower fares, but by only about $6.50. 
With a fourth carrier, fares drop even less, by 
about $2. Fares do not appear to fall any more 
once about four carriers are serving the route. At 
this point, discount fares are about $20 less than 
they would be if  only one carrier served the 
route. Extrapolation beyond this point is not 
warranted since the maximum number of carri-
ers on any route in our sample is only five. 
The above result for first-class fares does not 
mean that these fares are perfectly contestable, 
however. If we estimate the same model as equa-
tion 
insufficient 
but replace CARRIERS and CARRIERS2 
with a dummy variable equal to one if there is 
more than one carrier on the route and zero 
otherwise, we find that the coefficient of this var-
iable is significant and negative for first-class 
fares. First-class fares are about $21 lower on 
routes with more than one carrier, other things 
being equal. In other words, since fares are 
cheaper on routes with more than one carrier, 
these results do not support the notion that 
these routes are perfectly contestable. 
Earlier studies that investigated whether the 
market for air fares was perfectly contestable also 
found little support for perfect contestability. As 
mentioned above, their data generally came from 
the early 1980s and thus may have been estimated 
too soon after deregulation for the airlines to 
have adjusted to their new environment. Because 
our study employs fare data from April 1987, it is 
the lack of contestability is a result 
of the airlines' having  time to adjust 
to the deregulated environment. This data set 
also has the advantage of being gathered about a 
year after the merger wave that peaked in 1986. 
Not surprisingly, MILES has a positive and sig-
nificant estimated coefficient for each class of 
fares. Coach and discount fares have a significant 
amount of "fare taper": as the flight distance 
increases, the cost per mile falls. First-class fares 
8 
NOTE:  All  values are authors' calculations. Number of observations  = 163; 
R-squarec!  = 0.863. 
NOTE:  All  values are authors' calculations. Number of observations  =  323; 
R-squared  = 0.871. 
4  Cited in Kahn (1988). 
http://clevelandfed.org/research/review/do not exhibit this property to a significant 
extent. For a flight of average length, first-class 
and coach fares increase about $0.22 per mile 
and discount fares increase about $0.06 per mile. 
The PASS, SLOT, and HUB variables all measure 
possible capacity constraints facing the airlines 
serving a given route.5
W  5  It is reasonable to consider whether both the number of  caniers and 
the number of  passengers on a route should be  treated as endogenous varia-
bles in equation (1). Hausmn specification tests were performed and indicate 
that in setting the  fare on a given route, these variables can be  treated as 
exogenous variables. 
 HUB is not statistically sig-
nificant at the 5 percent level for any type of 
fares. The density of traffic on  a route as measured 
by the PASS  variable significantly increases dis-
count fares. Only discount-fare passengers pay the 
expected premium for flying into slot-restricted 
airports. Flying into a slot-restricted airport 
increases the one-way fare by about $18 for these 
passengers. 
Estimated  Standard 
Variable  Coefficient  Error  T-Ratio 
CARRIERS  -17.50  4.76  -3.67 
CARRIERS2  2.19  0.905  2.42 
MILES  0.791E-1  0.961E-2  8.24 
MILES2  -0.140E-4  0.434E-5  -3.23 
POP  -0.868E-3  0.829E-3  -1.05 
INC  -0.41  1E­2  0.679E-3  -6.05 
COW  -1.06  0.203  -5.22 
PASS  0.853  0.217E-3  3.93 
STOP  -3.85  1.48  -2.60 
SLOT  17.70  4.63  3.82 
HUB  -3.50  2.16  -1.62 
MEAL  1.80  2.21  0.813 
EA  -10.60  3.04  -3.49 
CO  -4.17  3.09  -1.35 
CONSTANT  113.00  9.10  12.40 
Flight characteristics, such as the number of 
intermediate stops on the flight, influence coach 
and discount fares, but not first-class fares. Coach 
passengers pay about $7.60 for each stop, whereas 
discount-fare passengers actually get compen-
sated about $3.85 for each stop. The fare charged 
does not seem to depend on whether the flight 
includes a meal. 
The characteristics of the cities involved influ-
ence the fare charged to the various classes of 
passengers. The larger the population of the 
origin city, the lower the fare for all three classes 
of service, although this result is statistically sig-
nificant at the 5 percent level only for first-class 
fares. The per-capita income variable seems to 
affect only discount fares significantly. Discount 
fares fall as incomes rise, indicating that higher- 
income passengers expect compensation in the 
form of lower fares for flying with discount 
tickets, other things being equal. The more 
important the city is as a business center (as 
measured by CORP), the higher the first-class 
and coach fares tend to be. Discount fares, on 
the other hand, are lower. 
equal.6 
Continental charges significantly less than 
other carriers for first-class and coach service, 
other things being equal. Conversely, Eastern 
charges significantly less for discount service 
than other airlines, other things being 
W  6  We only report results that controlled for Continental and Eastern Air-
lines, because only these  two caniers appeared to behave differently from the 
other caniers in setting fares. 
Texas Air  may own both of these carriers, but 
they appear to follow different criteria in setting 
fares. Keep in mind that these carrier-based fare 
differentials reflect differing cost and demand 
characteristics, including quality of service. 
IV.  Conclusion 
An  understanding of forces setting fares and the 
level of competition in the airline industry is 
crucial in order to formulate effective public pol-
icies for the industry. Some analysts have sug-
gested that the ease of entry into most airline 
markets after deregulation increased the compe-
titiveness of fares, even though the actual number 
of carriers is relatively small. We found that the 
number of airlines serving a route does influ-
ence the fares charged for all classes of service. 
Thus, the airline industry is not perfectly contest-
able even when very recent data are employed. 
The benefits to passengers of adding an addi-
tional carrier on a typical route are still sizable, 
with fares declining until about four carriers are 
serving the route. This result is the strongest for 
discount fares. Fares on routes with four to five 
carriers are about $20 less than fares on routes 
with only one carrier, other things being equal. 
This is about a third of the average one-way dis-
count fare. 
NOTE:  All  values are authors' calculations. Number of observations =  323; 
R-squared =  0.799. 
http://clevelandfed.org/research/review/Since deregulation, the airlines' clear goal has 
been to maximize their profits. Thus, they charge 
the highest fare possible on all their routes, with 
competition among existing carriers and the 
ease of entry of new carriers limiting how high 
those fares can be on a particular route. It is 
important that policymakers look at both the 
actual number of competitors and the ease of 
entry for a particular route. Since the number of 
carriers serving the typical route has risen since 
1983­even if one allows for the recent merger 
wave-this suggests that the market for air fares 
remains fairly competitive, but that public poli-
cies to ease the entry of more carriers per route 
could lead to increased benefits for consumers. 
In short, these findings suggest that the tradi-
tional concepts of market concentration, such as 
the number of competitors, are still relevant in 
assessing the amount of competition on a given 
route, even in the deregulated environment. Con-
sequently, the antitrust laws that are applied to 
other industries are pertinent to the airline 
industry. 
Deregulating 
Panzar,  Willig, 
The- 
Indust  Har- 
Severin, 
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